guru

Tusculan Disputations

Cicero

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1. ch. 3, para. 10. XV. M. Since I have spoken before of virtue in other places, and shall often have occ
2. ch. 3, para. 11. XVI. For what is not only more miserable, but more base and sordid, than a man afflic
3. ch. 3, para. 12. XVII. Whoever, then, through moderation and constancy, is at rest in his mind, and in
4. ch. 3, para. 12. you should desire too ardently, or the possession of which you should allow to transp
5. ch. 3, para. 13. XVIII. The man who attempts to set bounds to vice acts like one who should throw hims
6. ch. 3, para. 14. XIX. Why should I say more? Why should I add that the Peripatetics say that these per
7. ch. 3, para. 14. who said that it gave him pain if any mechanic was up in a morning at his work before
8. ch. 3, para. 16. Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause. And they say the other divisions of sor
9. ch. 3, para. 18. A. I think it is. I wait, therefore, to hear what you will say in reply to them. XXI.
10. ch. 3, para. 25. In action we had been, but that I wait Till each his sword had fitted to his hand. My
11. ch. 3, para. 29. XXIII. We ought to hold all things here in contempt; death is to be looked on with in
12. ch. 3, para. 34. Shall we say, then, that madness has its use? XXIV. Examine the definitions of courag
13. ch. 3, para. 35. u will perceive it. And in like manner, a warm-tempered man is 150not always in a pas
14. ch. 3, para. 37. Let him but grieve, no matter what the cause. But he spoke this of a debauched and di
15. ch. 3, para. 39. 151XXVI. But even envy, detraction, pity, have their use. Why should you pity rather
16. ch. 3, para. 39. ompose such gravity and constancy? Anything sudden or unforeseen? How can anything of
17. ch. 3, para. 40. XXVII. All these assertions proceed from the roots of errors, which must be entirely
18. ch. 3, para. 40. t, and whether it appears preferable to endeavor to remove that which has occasioned
19. ch. 3, para. 41. XXVIII. But any perturbation of the mind of this sort may be, as it were, wiped away
20. ch. 3, para. 41. commotion itself is vicious; for we mean by the expressions magnanimous and brave, on
21. ch. 3, para. 45. That human nature can support—52 But, in order to persuade those to whom any misfortu
22. ch. 3, para. 48. XXXI. Proceed we now to what are goods—that is to say, to joy and desire. To me, inde
23. ch. 3, para. 48. roperly called volatile; and as feeling envy is a part of grief, and the being please
24. ch. 3, para. 60. The God that love and hatred doth dispense! An excellent corrector of life this same
25. ch. 3, para. 67. Who naked bodies first exposed to view. Now, supposing them chaste, which I think is
26. ch. 3, para. 78. Oh! all ye winds, assist me! He thinks that the whole world ought to apply itself to
27. ch. 3, para. 88. Men should go mad.53 Now, is not this inconstancy and mutability of mind enough to de
28. ch. 3, para. 98. My children, and thus serves them up for meat. To what length now will not anger go?
29. ch. 3, para. 100. XXXVII. Where, then, are they who say that anger has its use? Can madness be of any u
30. ch. 3, para. 100. s; but Socrates kept him in countenance by declaring that such vices were natural to
31. ch. 3, para. 101. XXXVIII. But as the cause of perturbations is now discovered, 162for all of them aris
32. "163BOOK V.", para. 1. 163BOOK V.
33. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 1. WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.
34. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 2. I. This fifth day, Brutus, shall put an end to our Tusculan Disputations: on which da
35. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 2. ing in these bodily pains, and harassed 164also with troubles and uneasinesses, pecul
36. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 3. II. But the amendment of this fault, and of all our other vices and offences, is to b
37. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 3. eir not being able to look so far back, and from their not imagining that those men b
38. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 4. III. But, indeed, who can dispute the antiquity of philosophy, either in fact or name
39. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 4. the 166greatest possible variety of sports and the general concourse of all Greece. F
40. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 5. IV. Nor was Pythagoras the inventor only of the name, but he enlarged also the thing
41. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 7. M. But my friend Brutus thinks so, whose judgment, with submission, I greatly prefer
42. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 16. A. You must look out for something new if you would 168do any good. These things have
43. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 20. A. How so? M. Because turbulent motions and violent agitations of 169the mind, when i
44. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 21. rturbation. Now, if there be any one who holds the power of fortune, and everything h
45. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 24. A. I think, indeed, that that is almost the case. M. But yet that is more usually the
46. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 25. ll and happily—that he shall, in short, be forever 171happy? But let us see what she
47. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 28. A. You may do what you please; for it is not for me to prescribe what you shall do. M
48. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 30. IX. This is the point which Theophrastus was unable to maintain; for after he had onc
49. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 31. Fortune, not wisdom, rules the life of man. 173They say never did philosopher assert
50. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 32. or you to say so, who define the chief good by a strong constitution of body, and wel
51. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 33. X. But it is the duty of one who would argue accurately to consider not what is said,
52. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 33. e ravished, are contemptible, and that all those things which are the opposites of th
53. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 37. M. What! you would convict me from my own words, and bring against me what I had said
54. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 38. 176XII. Though Zeno the Cittiæan, a stranger and an inconsiderable coiner of words, a
55. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 39. XIII. From Plato, therefore, all my discourse shall be deduced, as if from some sacre
56. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 39. red with nothing but with the Deity itself, if I may be allowed the expression. This,
57. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 40. XIV. To me such are the only men who appear completely happy; for what can he want to
58. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 40. ity, on which freedom a happy life depends) who has, or may have, a multitude of evil
59. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 41. XV. But as the perturbations of the mind make life miserable, and tranquillity render
60. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 41. heap implies a quantity of grain of the same kind. And if this be once admitted, happ
61. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 42. XVI. I forbear to mention riches, which, as any one, let him be ever so unworthy, may
62. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 42. in his breast? A man, then, who is temperate and consistent, free from fear or 181gri
63. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 47. Where the sun rises, deeds like mine can trace? If, then, there is such a thing as a
64. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 51. As to be always strangers to defeat. But such a man, as I have said, will be defeated
65. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 54. 183I would not ask every one this question; for some one perhaps might answer that he
66. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 55. XX. Dionysius exercised his tyranny over the Syracusans thirty-eight years, being but
67. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 55. e a way over it with a wooden bridge, he drew that bridge over after shutting his bed
68. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 56. XXI. This tyrant, however, showed himself how happy he really was; for once, when Dam
69. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 57. XXII. Yet, how desirous he was of friendship, though at the same time he dreaded the
70. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 58. XXIII. Shall I not, then, prefer the life of Plato and Archytas, manifestly wise and
71. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 59. own ingenuity, which is the one most delicious food of the mind; the thoughts of the
72. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 60. XXIV. But that what I propose to demonstrate to you may not rest on mere words only,
73. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 60. nimate or inanimate, articulately speaking or mute; what occasioned their beginning a
74. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 62. The third qualification of our wise man is the next to be considered, which goes thro
75. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 63. XXVI. A. What, when in torments and on the rack? M. Do you imagine I am speaking of h
76. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 64. o right to say so if he were consistent with himself, what may they not do who allow
77. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 65. XXVII. But to dismiss the subtleties of the Stoics, which I am sensible I have employ
78. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 65. eing burned without a groan. The women, too, in India, on the death of their husbands
79. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 66. XXVIII. But let us not dwell too much on these questions, but rather let us return to
80. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 67. XXIX. A. Indeed I cannot; but I should be glad to prevail on you, unless it is troubl
81. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 69. XXX. These, then, are the opinions, as I think, that are held and defended—the first
82. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 70. XXXI. For even as trading is said to be lucrative, and farming advantageous, not beca
83. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 70. g that he talks thus wildly from some sudden impulse; but his opinion of death is, th
84. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 71. XXXII. But with how little is this man himself satisfied! No one has said more on fru
85. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 71. erosity. But Diogenes took a greater liberty, like a Cynic, when Alexander asked him
86. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 72. XXXIII. You see, I imagine, how Epicurus has divided his kinds of desires, not very a
87. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 72. the effects of it are to produce a greater pleasure: so that all pleasurable things,
88. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 73. XXXIV. For who does not see this, that an appetite is the best sauce? When Darius, in
89. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 73. eat abundance, and of incomparable sweetness. Add to this strength and health, as the
90. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 76. But what I left, though excellent, is lost. “What less than this,” says Aristotle, “c
91. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 78. XXXVI. Let us inquire, then, if obscurity, the want of power, or even the being unpop
92. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 78. e any such, he might go elsewhere to some other people.” Is not this the case with th
93. "WHETHER VIRTUE ALONE BE SUFFICIENT FOR A HAPPY LIFE.", para. 79. XXXVII. If, then, honor and riches have no value, what is there else to be afraid of?
94. ch. 4, para. 1. “Wherever I am happy is my country.” Socrates, indeed, when he was asked where he bel
95. ch. 4, para. 3. XXXVIII. Besides the emotions of the mind, all griefs 203and anxieties are assuaged b
96. ch. 4, para. 3. ng whatever was required of him with respect either to the republic or his own affair
97. ch. 4, para. 4. XXXIX. When I was a boy, Cn. Aufidius, a blind man, 204who had served the office of p
98. ch. 4, para. 4. ntry, what coast, what part of Greece, what military attacks, what dispositions of ba
99. ch. 4, para. 5. XL. Now, as to the evil of being deaf. M. Crassus was a little thick of hearing; but
100. ch. 4, para. 5. is a matter which you have in your own power,” said Paulus. I said many things about